My research addresses topics in international and comparative political economy. My core research has focused on the consequences of financial integration for democracy, accountability, and prospects of income redistribution in emerging economies. I am also interested in the politics of foreign direct investment and political risk, international policy diffusion, political ideology and Latin American politics. Click here for my C.V. in pdf format.
In this book, I employ a combination of formal theory, large-N empirical analyses, as well as in-depth case studies of Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela and Argentina, to shed light on the inner workings and long term consequences of financial markets' influence on economic policymaking. The book focuses on the interaction between investors and politicians during national elections. It identifies how financial markets respond to the victory of the left, and determines the political and economic conditions under which market responses push leftist governments into adopting a conservative economic agenda. The book also explains why market discipline, imposed during elections, leads to long-term ideological convergence between left and right-wing economic policies in some political systems but not in others.
Economic voting is a widely accepted regularity in the political science literature, yet most work on the subject either assumes that economic performance is a direct result of policymaking or, more recently, argues that voters can identify when this is not the case. Our book challenges these claims by showing that, in a large subset of Latin American countries, presidents' succcess strongly depends on factors that are unambiguously exogenous to policymaking. We adopt a multi-method approach to explore the conditions that affect voters' capacity to distinguish competence from chance when evaluating their governments, as well as the implications of that behavior for democratic accountability in the region.